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ABSTRACT
We consider fixed-interval smoothing problems for counter-
adversarial autonomous systems. An adversary deploys an au-
tonomous filtering and control system that i) measures our current
state via a noisy sensor, ii) computes a posterior estimate (belief)
and iii) takes an action that we can observe. Based on such observed
actions and our knowledge of our state sequence, we aim to estimate
the adversary’s past and current beliefs – this forms a foundation
for predicting, and counteracting against, future actions. We de-
rive the optimal smoother for the adversary’s beliefs (we treat the
problem in a Bayesian framework). Moreover, we demonstrate how
the smoother can be computed for discrete systems even though the
corresponding backward variables do not admit a finite-dimensional
characterization. Finally, we illustrate our results in numerical
simulations.
Index Terms— counter-adversarial autonomous systems, in-
verse filtering, adversarial signal processing, belief estimation
1. INTRODUCTION
During the last decade, the importance of defense against cyber-
adversarial and autonomous treats has been highlighted on numer-
ous occasions – e.g., [1, 2, 3]. In this paper, we consider the design
of counter-adversarial autonomous (CAA) systems.
In a CAA system, an adversary employs an autonomous filtering
and control system that estimates our state and takes actions based
on its control policy [1, 4]. Mathematically, it can be seen as a game
between two players (us and the adversary), with the following dy-
namics:
us: xk ∼ Pxk−1,x = p(x|xk−1), x0 ∼ pi0, (1a)
adversary: yk ∼ Bxk,y = p(y|xk), (1b)
adversary: pik = T (pik−1, yk), (1c)
adversary & us: ak ∼ Gpik,a = p(a|pik), (1d)
where by ∼ we mean “distributed according to” and k denotes dis-
crete time. To be more specific, the model (1a)-(1d) should be inter-
preted as follows:
• xk ∈ X is our Markovian state that evolves according to a
transition kernel P . Its initial distribution is pi0.
• yk ∈ Y is the adversary’s observation of our current state.
The observation is sampled according to the observation like-
lihoods B.
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• The map T is the classical Bayesian filter (e.g., [5, 6]):
{T (pi, y)}(x) = Bx,y
∫
X Pζ,xpi(ζ)dζ∫
X Bx,y
∫
X Pζ,xpi(ζ)dζdx
, (2)
that computes the belief pik(x) = p(xk = x | y1, . . . , yk)
recursively. This update is performed by the adversary who
is trying to estimate our state xk.
• The adversary selects an action based on its current belief pik,
and ak ∈ A is our measurement of it. Note that G allows for
a randomized policy and/or a noisy observation of the action.
The central question that we pose in this paper is:
Given what is known to us (i.e., the state sequence
x0, . . . , xk and the observed actions a1, . . . , ak), how
to estimate the adversary’s beliefs pi1, . . . , pik?
Reconstructing the adversary’s beliefs forms a foundation for ana-
lyzing the behaviour of the adversary; it provides a way of predicting
and, hence also taking appropriate counter-actions against, future
actions. Moreover, it leads to other important questions: How ac-
curate are the adversary’s sensors? How should our state sequence
(transition kernel) be designed so as to estimate the adversary’s sen-
sors as accurately as possible and/or to confuse it? These questions
have practical implications in, not only electronic warfare and cyber-
physical security, but also in, e.g., radar calibration and interactive
learning [4].
In summary, the main results of this paper are:
• We derive a recursion for the optimal smoother for estimat-
ing the adversary’s beliefs given the state sequence and its
observed actions;
• For discrete CAA systems, we provide a finite algorithm
for computing the fixed-interval smoother – even though
the backward variables do not admit a finite-dimensional
characterization;
• We illustrate and evaluate the performance of the optimal
smoother in numerical simulations.
1.1. Related Work
Inverse estimation and control problems have a long history in signal
processing and automatic control. For example, Kalman studied the
inverse optimal control problem already in 1964 [7] (aiming to deter-
mine for what cost criteria a given control policy is optimal). More
recently, inverse problems in image signal processing (e.g., denois-
ing and medical image reconstruction) have received attention [8].
The problems considered in the present paper are a type of in-
verse filtering problem [9, 10, 4]. Algebraic solutions to the problem
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of reconstructing sensor parameters given posteriors from hidden
Markov models and linear Gaussian state-space models have been
proposed in [9] and [10], respectively. In a CAA-system scenario,
these works assume direct access to the adversary’s beliefs and use
them to infer its sensor’s specifications – more realistically, the ad-
versary would reveal only actions based on its beliefs.
To deal with this assumption, [11] considers sequential stochas-
tic decision problems and determines the set of beliefs that a rational
adversary could have held given an observed action. The proposed
solution is based on inverse optimization techniques and, essentially,
inverts relation (1d). The work is oblivious to the process generat-
ing the adversary’s beliefs, which, in a CAA system, is the model
(1a)-(1c). In comparison, in the present paper, we take the full gen-
erative model into account and compute the Bayesian posterior of
the adversary’s beliefs. Due to being model-based, we can rule out
beliefs that are feasible with respect to the adversary’s policy, but not
with respect to the dynamics of the game. Moreover, we obtain a full
probabilistic characterization of how likely different beliefs are.
We build on and extend the recent work [4] (and its journal-
preprint [12]) in which a Bayesian framework for inverse filtering
in CAA systems was proposed. In particular, [4] derived the opti-
mal inverse filter (which computes the posterior over the adversary’s
current belief given a state-sequence and actions). We employ this
result to derive the optimal smoother (which computes the posteri-
ors over all the adversary’s past beliefs). This yields more accurate
estimates (in a mean-squared error sense), since more information is
included in the smoother than the filter [13].
The organization of the paper is as follows. Preliminaries and
formal problem definitions are given in Section 2. In Section 3,
we show how the smoother’s forward variables can be computed.
The paper’s main contributions are in Section 4 where the optimal
smoother for estimating the adversary’s beliefs is derived. There, we
also specialize to discrete CAA systems. Finally, we evaluate the
proposed algorithms in numerical simulations in Section 5.
2. PRELIMINARIES AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we detail our notation and how the model (1a)-
(1d) instantiates itself for discrete counter-adversarial autonomous
(CAA) systems. We also provide formal statements of the problems
we treat in this paper.
2.1. Notation
All vectors are column vectors unless transposed. The vector of all
ones is denoted 1 and the ith Cartesian basis vector ei. The element
at row i and column j of a matrix is [·]ij , and the element at position
i of a vector is [·]i. The vector operator diag(·) : Rn → Rn×n gives
the matrix where the vector has been put on the diagonal, and all
other elements are zero. The indicator function I{·} takes the value
1 if the expression · is fulfilled and 0 otherwise. We employ ξ0:k as
shorthand for the sequence ξ0, . . . , ξk, and define ξk+1:k = ∅.
2.2. Discrete CAA Systems
In discrete CAA systems, the model (1a)-(1d) takes the form:
• Our state xk ∈ X = {1, . . . , X} is finite. It evolves ac-
cording to a transition probability matrix P with elements
[P ]ij = Pr[xk+1 = j|xk = i], where 1 ≤ i, j ≤ X .
• The adversary’s observation yk ∈ Y = {1, . . . , Y } is also
finite. It is sampled according to an observation probability
matrix B with elements [B]ij = Pr[yk = j|xk = i], where
1 ≤ i ≤ X and 1 ≤ j ≤ Y .
• Note that xk and yk define a discrete-time hidden Markov
model (HMM). Hence, the Bayesian filter T employed by the
adversary is the HMM filter (e.g., [5, 6]):
pik = T (pik−1, yk) =
BykP
Tpik−1
1TBykP
Tpik−1
, (3)
where the belief pik ∈ RX is a a non-negative vector [pik]i =
Pr[xk = i|y1:k], and By = diag(Bey) ∈ RX×X is a diago-
nal matrix of the yth column of the observation matrix B.
• ak ∈ A = {1, . . . , A} is our measurement of the adversary’s
action based on its current belief pik.
2.3. Inverse Filtering Problems for CAA Systems
Formally, the problems we consider in this paper are:
Problem 1. Consider the CAA system (1a)-(1d). Suppose prob-
ability distributions P , G and B are known, as well as the initial
belief pi0. Given a state sequence x0, . . . , xN and observed actions
a1, . . . , aN , estimate the adversary’s belief pik by computing:
a) the filter posterior p(pik|a1:k, x0:k);
b) the smoother posterior p(pik|a1:N , x0:N ),
where k ≤ N .
Recall that from a practical point of view, estimating the adver-
sary’s belief allows us to predict (in a Bayesian sense) future actions
of the adversary. In the design of CAA systems, this facilitates tak-
ing effective measures against such actions.
Remark 1. In terms of our assumptions; since we control the state
sequence via P , we can argue for perfect knowledge of it. The ad-
versary’s policy and G can be estimated by reasoning about what is
rational of the adversary’s to do in different scenarios. Knowledge
of the adversary’s sensor B is a stronger assumption. However, the
solution to Problem 1 (under this assumption) is part of the solu-
tion proposed in [4] on how to estimate the adversary’s sensor B in
a maximum-likelihood sense (based on its observed actions and the
state sequence) – hence, Problem 1 can be seen as a means to an end.
3. OPTIMAL INVERSE FILTER
FOR ESTIMATING THE CURRENT BELIEF
In this section, we present the solution of the inverse filtering prob-
lem for CAA systems that was proposed in [4] – it estimates the ad-
versary’s beliefs by a filtering recursion. This is a crucial component
of the optimal smoother we derive in the next section.
3.1. General Inverse Filter
Under the model defined in (1a)-(1d), the aim of Problem 1a is to
compute the posterior of the adversary’s current belief given knowl-
edge of our state sequence and its recorded actions up to the present
time:
αk(pi)
def.
= p(pik = pi|a1:k, x0:k). (4)
Before providing the details, note that αk(·) is a density over Π,
where Π is the set of all beliefs from (2). In particular, if the state-
space X is continuous, then Π is a function space comprising the
space of density functions; if X is finite, then Π is the unit (X − 1)-
dimensional simplex (corresponding to X-dimensional probability
vectors).
The key result in [4] is a recursive algorithm for computing the
posterior αk(pi):
Theorem 1 ([4]). The posterior αk in (4) satisfies the following fil-
tering recursion initialized by a prior random measure α0 = p(pi0):
αk+1(pi) =
Gpi,ak+1
∫
Π
Bxk+1,ypik,piαk(pik)dpik∫
Π
Gpi,ak+1
∫
Π
Bxk+1,ypik,piαk(pik)dpikdpi
. (5)
Here, ypik,pi is the observation such that pi = T (pik, y) where T
is the adversary’s filter (1c). The conditional mean estimate of the
belief is E
{
pik+1|a1:k, x0:k
}
=
∫
Π
piαk+1(pi)dpi.
We refer to the update (5) as the optimal inverse filter. For sim-
plicity, we assume the initial prior to be a Dirac-delta function placed
in pi0, i.e., α0(pi) = δ(pi − pi0).
3.2. Inverse Filter for Discrete CAA Systems
Depending on the characteristics of the adversary’s belief space Π,
the integrals in (5) can be tractable or not to compute. A few spe-
cial cases admit finite-dimensional characterizations of the optimal
inverse filter: discrete CAA systems and linear-Gaussian CAA sys-
tems [4]. We will focus on the first, where the integrals, essentially,
are replaced by sums.
Consider the CAA system (1a)-(1d) with discrete variables as
given in Section 2.2. Define the following recursive sequence of
belief sets:
Πk
def.
= {T (pi, y) : y ∈ Y, pi ∈ Πk−1} , (6)
initiated with Π0 = {pi0}. Then, from Theorem 1, it follows that the
optimal inverse filter has the following finite-dimensional form:
Corollary 1. For a discrete CAA system (defined in Section 2.2), the
optimal inverse filter (5) takes the form
αk+1(pi) =
Gpi,ak+1
∑
p¯i∈Πk Bxk+1,yp¯i,piαk(p¯i)∑
pi∈Πk+1 Gpi,ak+1
∑
p¯i∈Πk Bxk+1,yp¯i,piαk(p¯i)
, (7)
where Πk is defined in (6). The conditional mean estimate of the
adversary’s belief is
E
{
pik+1|a1:k+1, x0:k+1
}
=
∑
pi∈Πk+1
piαk+1(pi). (8)
Remark 2. It should be noted that Bx,∅ = 0 – which happens if
there is no observation yp¯i,pi that maps p¯i to pi via the filter T .
4. OPTIMAL FIXED-INTERVAL SMOOTHER FOR
ESTIMATING BELIEFS IN CAA SYSTEMS
We are now in a position to derive the main theoretical result of this
paper: Given knowledge of our state sequence x0:N and recorded
actions of the adversary a1:N , what can be said about the corre-
sponding (for us, unobserved) sequence of beliefs pi1:N that were
held by the adversary? More specifically, we aim to determine the
conditional distribution of the belief at time k given measurements
up to time N ≥ k (i.e., Problem 1b). This is a well-studied problem
for partially observed dynamical models and the task is generally
referred to as smoothing [5, 6].
x0 x1 x2 xk xN. . . . . .
y1 y2 yk yN
pi1pi0 pi2 pik piN. . . . . .
a1 a2 ak aN
Fig. 1: The graphical model underlying the inverse filtering problem
for CAA systems – i.e., (1a)-(1d). The shaded nodes are known to
us, and the white nodes are known only to the adversary. Our aim is
to estimate the adversary’s beliefs pi1, . . . , piN .
4.1. Optimal Smoother for CAA Systems
We focus on determining the fixed-interval smoother in which the
number of measurementsN is kept fixed and the aim is to determine
the conditional distribution of pik for values of k between 1 and N
– the underlying graphical model is illustrated in Fig. 1. From this
result, it is easy to derive, e.g., the fixed-lag smoother (where one
tries to estimate the adversary’s belief some fixed number of time-
steps in the past for an ever-increasing number of measurementsN ).
Our key result is the following theorem that provides a recursive
algorithm for computing the (fixed-interval) smoothing distribution
αk|N (pi)
def.
= p(pik = pi|a1:N , x0:N ), (9)
where N is fixed and 1 ≤ k ≤ N .
Theorem 2. The smoothing distribution αk|N (pi) satisfies
αk|N (pi) =
βk|N (pi)αk(pi)∫
Π
βk|N (pi)αk(pi)dpi
, (10)
where αk(pi) is the optimal inverse filter (5) – or, the forward vari-
able – and the backward variable βk|N (pi) can be computed recur-
sively via
βk|N (pi) =
∫
Π
Gz,ak+1Pxk,xk+1Bxk,ypi,zβk+1|N (z)dz, (11)
initialized by βN|N (pi) = 1, for all pi ∈ Π.
Note that, as in Theorem 1, ypi,z is the observation such that
z = T (pi, y), where T is the adversary’s filter (1c), and the smoothed
conditional-mean estimate is
E
{
pik|a1:N , x0:N
}
=
∫
Π
piαk|N (pi)dpi. (12)
Remark 3. We do not refer to this as an “optimal inverse smoother”,
but rather as an “optimal smoother for the inverse filtering problem
for CAA systems”. It is the adversary’s filter we try to invert (by
using a smoother); the adversary is not employing a smoother.
4.2. Optimal Smoother for Discrete CAA Systems
We now show how Theorem 2 can be applied to discrete CAA sys-
tems. Even though the state and observation spaces are discrete,
the corresponding backward variable βk|N (pi) does not allow for a
finite-dimensional characterization. Fortunately, however, in order
to compute the smoother αk|N (pi), it is sufficient to evaluate the
backward variable in a finite number of points. Below, we describe
how to obtain its values in these points recursively.
[pi]1
[pi]2
[pi]3
Optimal Inverse Filter
αk(pi)
[pi]1
[pi]2
[pi]3
Optimal Smoother
αk|N (pi)
Fig. 2: The figures show, left, the optimal inverse filter αk(pi), and,
right, the smoother αk|N (pi) at time k = 3 andN = 6. The bars dis-
play the probability mass function (some beliefs have zero probabil-
ity). The actual belief of the adversary (on the yellow unit simplex)
is marked with a green cross, and the conditional mean estimate
(CME) by a red circle. One should note that the smoother’s CME
lies closer to the actual belief – hence, providing a better estimate.
Theorem 3. For a discrete CAA system (defined in Section 2.2), the
smoother αk|N (pi) can be evaluated via
αk|N (pi) =
β\k|N (pi)αk(pi)∑
z∈Πk β
\
k|N (z)αk(z)
, (13)
where αk(pi) is the optimal inverse filter (5) and β\k|N (pi) is the null-
extended restriction of βk|N (pi) to Πk (defined in (6)):
β\k|N (pi) =
{
βk|N (pi) if pi ∈ Πk,
0 otherwise.
(14)
The restriction of βk|N (pi) to Πk can be computed recursively via
βk|N (pi) =
∑
z∈Πk+1
Gz,ak+1Pxk,xk+1Bxk,ypi,zβk+1|N (z), (15)
for pi ∈ Πk, initialized by βN|N (pi) = 1 for all pi ∈ ΠN .
In summary, to evaluate the smoothing distribution αk|N (pi) for
a discrete CAA system, one
i) computes the optimal inverse filter αk(pi) via (7);
ii) computes the backward variables βk|N (pi) on the points in
the sets Πk via the recursion in (15), and uses this to obtain
the null-extended restricted backward variable β\k|N (pi) via
(14);
iii) combines the filter αk(pi) and β\k|N (pi) using (13).
5. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we illustrate and evaluate the theoretical results in
numerical simulations. We consider a three-state system so that
pik ∈ R3, and the filter αk(pi) and smoother αk|N (pi) yield prob-
ability mass functions (pmfs) over the 2-dimensional unit simplex.
In particular, we consider the following CAA system:
P =
0.7 0.2 0.10.1 0.4 0.5
0.1 0.1 0.8
 , B =
0.3 0.3 0.40.1 0.8 0.1
0.1 0.4 0.5
 , (16)
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Average Error in Estimation of Adversary’s Belief pik
filter
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Fig. 3: Average error of the conditional mean estimate (CME) of
the inverse filter and smoother, compared to the adversary’s actual
belief pik. The smoother yields, on average, more accurate estimates.
Note that the smoother and the filter coincide at the last point in the
interval – that is, αN (pi) = αN|N (pi).
with A = {1, 2} and a G that yields the first action if [pik]1 ≥ 0.5,
and the second action otherwise.
5.1. Illustration
In the left plot of Fig. 2, we illustrate the pmf of the optimal in-
verse filter α3(pi) = p(pi3 = pi|a1:3, x0:3) computed via (7). We
have marked the conditional mean estimate (CME) with a red cir-
cle, and the adversary’s actual belief with a green cross. It should
be noted that the optimal inverse filter assigns zero probability to
several points in the set Π3.
In the right plot, we illustrate the smoother α3|6(pi) = p(pi3 =
pi|a1:6, x0:6) computed via (13). Its CME and the adversary’s actual
belief are marked as before. The smoother, having access to addi-
tional data (i.e., the actions a4:6 and states x4:6), rules out one of the
potential beliefs of the adversary. Consequently, its CME is closer
to the actual belief of the adversary.
5.2. Improved Accuracy in Estimating the Adversary’s Beliefs
Next, we compute the error between the actual belief of the ad-
versary pik and the CMEs of the optimal inverse filter (8) and the
smoother (12) for various values of k between 1 and N = 6. We
average the errors over 1000 realizations. The results are in Fig. 3.
The smoother yields, on average, a lower error than the filter. Its
estimate of the adversary’s actual belief is better since it can incorpo-
rate more information – not only measurements up to time k when
estimating pik, but also those from times k + 1, . . . , N . It should
be noted that the filter αk(pi) and smoother αk|N (pi) coincide for
k = N , and hence, yield the same average error.
6. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
We have derived the optimal smoother for inverse filtering in
counter-adversarial autonomous (CAA) systems – the goal be-
ing to estimate an adversary’s beliefs given observed actions and
knowledge of the state sequence. As expected, the smoother is more
accurate (in terms of mean-squared errors) than the optimal inverse
filter because it has access to more information, which we verified
in numerical simulations. Moreover, we proposed a finite algorithm
for discrete CAA systems.
Future work includes studying the important problem of mis-
matched systems (e.g., where the adversary does not have perfect
knowledge of the transition kernel P ) and dealing with the compu-
tational concerns resulting from the exponential growth of the sets
of potential beliefs (|Πk| = Y k) in discrete CAA systems using, for
example, particle filters and smoothers [14].
7. REFERENCES
[1] A. Kuptel, “Counter unmanned autonomous systems
(CUAxS): Priorities. Policy. Future Capabilities,” Multi-
national Capability Development Campaign (MCDC),
pp. 15–16, 2017.
[2] M. Barni and F. Pe´rez-Gonza´lez, “Coping with the enemy: Ad-
vances in adversary-aware signal processing,” in IEEE Interna-
tional Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing
(ICASSP’13), pp. 8682–8686, IEEE, 2013.
[3] J. P. Farwell and R. Rohozinski, “Stuxnet and the future of
cyber war,” Survival, vol. 53, no. 1, pp. 23–40, 2011.
[4] V. Krishnamurthy and M. Rangaswamy, “How to calibrate
your adversary’s capabilities? Inverse filtering for counter-
autonomous systems,” in IEEE International Conference on
Information Fusion (FUSION’19), 2019.
[5] V. Krishnamurthy, Partially Observed Markov Decision Pro-
cesses. Cambridge University Press, 2016.
[6] O. Cappe´, E. Moulines, and T. Ryde´n, Inference in Hidden
Markov Models. Springer, 2005.
[7] R. E. Kalman, “When is a linear control system optimal,” Jour-
nal of Basic Engineering, vol. 86, no. 1, pp. 51–60, 1964.
[8] M. T. McCann, K. H. Jin, and M. Unser, “Convolutional neural
networks for inverse problems in imaging: A review,” IEEE
Signal Processing Magazine, vol. 34, no. 6, pp. 85–95, 2017.
[9] R. Mattila, C. R. Rojas, V. Krishnamurthy, and B. Wahlberg,
“Inverse filtering for hidden Markov models,” in Advances in
Neural Information Processing Systems (NIPS’17), pp. 4207–
4216, 2017.
[10] R. Mattila, C. R. Rojas, V. Krishnamurthy, and B. Wahlberg,
“Inverse filtering for linear Gaussian state-space models,”
in IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC’18),
pp. 5556–5561, Dec 2018.
[11] R. Mattila, I. Lourenc¸o, C. R. Rojas, V. Krishnamurthy, and
B. Wahlberg, “Estimating private beliefs of Bayesian agents
based on observed decisions,” IEEE Control Systems Letters,
vol. 3, pp. 523–528, July 2019.
[12] V. Krishnamurthy and M. Rangaswamy, “How to calibrate
your adversary’s capabilities? Inverse filtering for counter-
autonomous systems,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1905.07230, 2019.
[13] B. D. O. Anderson and J. B. Moore, Optimal Filtering.
Prentice-Hall, 1979.
[14] A. Doucet and A. M. Johansen, “A tutorial on particle filtering
and smoothing: Fifteen years later,” Handbook of nonlinear
filtering, vol. 12, no. 656-704, p. 3, 2009.
8. THE COMPLETE CAA SYSTEMMODEL
In more generality, the CAA model (1a)-(1d) takes the form:
us: xk ∼ Pxk−1,x = p(x|xk−1), x0 ∼ pi0
adversary: yk ∼ Bxk,y = p(y|xk),
adversary: pik = T (pik−1, yk),
adversary: uk ∼ Cpik,u = p(u|pik),
us: ak ∼ Duk,a = p(a|uk),
where uk ∈ A is the action taken by the adversary (according to a
control policy C) and ak ∈ A is our observation (via D) of it. In
the paper, to simplify, we assume we have direct access to Gpi,a =∑
u∈ADu,aCpi,u.
9. PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Proof. Consider the smoothing distribution
αk|N (pi) = p(pik = pi|a1:N , x0:N )
=
p(pik = pi, a1:N , x0:N )∫
Π
p(pik = pi′, a1:N , x0:N )dpi′
=
p(pik = pi, ak+1:N , xk+1:N |a1:k, x0:k)∫
Π
p(pik = pi′, ak+1:N , xk+1:N |a1:k, x0:k)dpi′
=
p(ak+1:N , xk+1:N |pik = pi, a1:k, x0:k)αk(pi)∫
Π
p(ak+1:N , xk+1:N |pik = pi′, a1:k, x0:k)αk(pi′)dpi′ , (17)
where in the third equality the term p(a1:k, x0:k) cancels in numer-
ator and denominator, and in the last equality we have identified
p(pik = pi|a1:k, x0:k) = αk(pi) as the optimal inverse filter (5).
Now, note that ak+1:N , xk+1:N and a1:k, x0:k−1 are condition-
ally independent given pik, xk, so that
αk|N (pi) =
p(ak+1:N , xk+1:N |pik = pi, xk)αk(pi)∫
Π
p(ak+1:N , xk+1:N |pik = pi′, xk)αk(pi′)dpi′
=
βk|N (pi)αk(pi)∫
Π
βk|N (pi′)αk(pi′)dpi′
, (18)
where we have defined
βk|N (pi)
def.
= p(ak+1:N , xk+1:N |pik = pi, xk). (19)
We refer to βk|N (pi) as the the backward variable since it can be
computed via a backward recursion. To show this, begin with
βk|N (pi) = p(ak+1:N , xk+1:N |pik = pi, xk)
=
∫
Π
p(ak+1:N , xk+1:N , pik+1 = z|pik = pi, xk)dz
=
∫
Π
p(ak+2:N , xk+2:N |ak+1, xk+1, pik+1 = z, pik = pi, xk)
× p(ak+1, xk+1, pik+1 = z|pik = pi, xk)dz.
(20)
The first factor inside the integral equals βk+1|N (z) (due to condi-
tional independence), and the second factor
p(ak+1, xk+1, pik+1 = z|pik = pi, xk)
=
∫
Y
p(ak+1, xk+1, pik+1 = z, yk+1 = y|pik = pi, xk)dy
(21)
can be factorized as follows:
• p(ak+1|xk+1, pik+1 = z, yk+1 = y, pik = pi, xk)
= p(ak+1|pik+1 = z) = Gz,ak+1 ;
• p(pik+1 = z|xk+1, yk+1 = y, pik = pi, xk)
= p(pik+1 = z|yk+1 = y, pik = pi) = I{z − T (pi, y)}, since
the map T is deterministic;
• p(yk+1 = y|xk+1, pik = pi, xk)
= p(yk+1 = y|xk+1) = Bxk+1,y;
• p(xk+1|pik = pi, xk) = p(xk+1|xk) = Pxk,xk+1 .
Taken together in (21), we obtain
p(ak+1, xk+1,pik+1 = z|pik = pi, xk)
=
∫
Y
Gz,ak+1 I{z − T (pi, y)}Bxk+1,yPxk,xk+1dy
= Gz,ak+1Bxk+1,ypi,zPxk,xk+1 , (22)
which, finally, when introduced in (20) yields the recursion
βk|N (pi) =
∫
Π
βk+1|N (z)Gz,ak+1Bxk+1,ypi,zPxk,xk+1dz. (23)
Here, we have defined ypi,p¯i as the y ∈ Y such that p¯i = T (pi, y).
Since βN|N (pi) = p(aN+1:N , xN+1:N |piN = pi, xN ) =
p(∅|piN = pi, xN ) = 1, the recursion is initialized by
βN|N (pi) = 1, (24)
for all pi ∈ Π.
10. PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Proof. The theorem follows by induction. First, note that we can
trivially evaluate βN|N (pi) for all pi ∈ ΠN (since βN|N (pi) = 1 for
all pi ∈ Π).
Now, suppose we can evaluate βk+1|N (pi) for all pi ∈ Πk+1.
Then, consider evaluating βk|N (pi) for pi ∈ Πk via (11):
βk|N (pi) =
∫
Π
Gz,ak+1Pxk,xk+1Bxk,ypi,zβk+1|N (z)dz. (25)
The factor Bxk,ypi,z is only non-zero for z:s in the set
{p¯i ∈ Π : ∃y ∈ Y s.t. p¯i = T (pi, y)}, (26)
that is, for those beliefs that can be obtained from the belief pi
through some observation y. By noting that we are only aiming to
evaluate (25) for pi ∈ Πk, we see that the set (26) coincides with the
definition of Πk+1 given in (6). Hence,
βk|N (pi) =
∫
Π
Gz,ak+1Pxk,xk+1Bxk,ypi,zβk+1|N (z)dz
=
∫
Πk+1
Gz,ak+1Pxk,xk+1Bxk,ypi,zβk+1|N (z)dz
=
∑
z∈Πk+1
Gz,ak+1Pxk,xk+1Bxk,ypi,zβk+1|N (z). (27)
By our induction-assumption, we can evaluate βk+1|N (z) for z ∈
Πk+1. This demonstrates that we have access to βk|N (pi) for pi ∈
Πk.
Observe that when evaluating the smoother αk|N (pi) via (10),
the inverse filter αk(pi) yields zero for any pi 6∈ Πk. Hence, the
value of βk|N (pi) for pi 6∈ Πk is irrelevant (since it multiplies αk(pi)
which is zero there). We can thus, for example, use the null-extended
restriction of βk|N (pi) to Πk:
βk|N (pi)αk(pi)∫
Π
βk|N (pi)αk(pi)dpi
=
β\k|N (pi)αk(pi)∑
z∈Πk β
\
k|N (z)αk(z)
, (28)
which we have access to (per the above induction proof).
11. DETAILS ON CAA SYSTEM
USED IN NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
In the numerical experiments, we use the following CAA system:
P =
0.7 0.2 0.10.1 0.4 0.5
0.1 0.1 0.8
 , B =
0.3 0.3 0.40.1 0.8 0.1
0.1 0.4 0.5
 , (29)
and A = {1, 2} with the G induced by
a = 1
a = 2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
[pi]1
[pi]2
[pi]3
i.e.,
Gpi,a=1 =
{
1 if [pi]1 ≥ 0.5,
0 otherwise,
(30)
and
Gpi,a=2 =
{
1 if [pi]1 < 0.5,
0 otherwise.
(31)
